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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
BLANKET SEARCH CONDITIONS
In Morrissey v. Brewer,' the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that parole is a form
of "conditional liberty"2 giving rise to certain
procedural safeguards before a parolee's3 lib-
erty may be revoked. One year later, in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli,a the Court applied the same ration-
ale to probationers5 facing revocation. Re-
cently, courts have focused upon the substance
of such conditions and questioned to what ex-
tent they may restrict the probationer's liberty.
One condition which is frequently attached to
probation requires the probationer to surren-
der his fourth amendment' right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Courts have di-
vided as to whether such a condition may be
sustained.
In its broadest form, the condition is a "blan-
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2 The parolee gains his freedom subject to certain
conditions such as the requirement that he not associ-
ate with convicted felons. Id. at 478.
3 A parolee is a convict who is released from a
penal institution to serve the remainder of his sen-
tence under the supervision of a parole officer. See,
e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 2(c)
(Vernon 1966).
4 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
1 A probationer is a person convicted of a crime
who is released into the community under the super-
vision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration.
E.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 2(b)
(Vernon 1966).
There does not seem to be any significant differ-
ence between the constitutional status of probationers
and parolees. In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the reasons for justifying warrantless
searches by parole officers of their parolees are
equally applicable in the probation setting. Both pa-
role and probation officers have "a special and
unique interest in invading the privacy of ... [paro-
lees or probationers] under their supervision." Id. at
265-66. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973),
the Supreme Court suggested this similarity, stating
that "revocation of probation . . . is constitutionally
indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." Id.
at 782 n.3.
6 The right of people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
ket" search condition, often requiring the pro-
bationer to "[s]ubmit his person, place of resi-
dence and vehicle to search and seizure at any
time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant, whenever requested to do so by
the Probation Officer or any law enforcement
officer." 7 The validity of the blanket search
condition depends upon the constitutional sta-
tus accorded the probationer. The court di-
vines the location of the probationer on a con-
tinuum of enjoyment of fourth amendment
rights, from the prisoner (minimum) to the free
person (maximum). If the court accords the
probationer fourth amendment rights, the next
step is to determine the role of the exclusionary
rule8 in the revocation hearing.
There is a substantial split in authority
among jurisdictions that have dealt with the
relationship of the fourth amendment to the
probationer.9 Both analyses begin with the basic
7 Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 762, 488
P.2d 630, 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 303 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
s Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment cannot be used in a criminal
proceeding against the victim of the unreasonable
search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The judicially-created remedy was not designed to
compensate for the unlawful invasion of one's pri-
vacy, but to deter future unlawful police conduct. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), "[tlhe rule is calcu-
lated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it." The rule has never
been interpreted to proscribe the use of all illegally-
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all per-
sons. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclu-
sionary rule not applicable to grand jury proceed-
ings); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973)
(only victim of unlawful search has standing to invoke
exclusionary rule); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (evidence obtained in violation of Miranda not
admissible in prosecutor's case in chief but admissible
for impeachment purposes); United States v. Schi-
pani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
983 (1971) (exclusionary rule not applicable to sent-
encing proceedings).
9 Recent cases upholding a blanket search condi-
tion include Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d
763 (1972); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D.
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premise that a condition must have a reasona-
ble relationship to promoting the probationer's
rehabilitation while affording a measure of
protection to society. The issue dividing the
courts is the extent to which a probationer's
freedoms must be curtailed to achieve this dual
purpose. The traditional view is that legitimate
government demands-the goals of the proba-
tion system - validate the imposition of any type
of search condition. The new approach is that
while search conditions are necessary, a blanket
search condition is not.
People v. Mason1° illustrates the traditional
view upholding blanket search and seizure con-
ditions. After tracing a burglary suspect's car to
the defendant, the police discovered that he
was on probation and subject to a blanket
search condition. On the strength of this condi-
tion, the officers searched the defendant's
home and discovered items of contraband. The
Supreme Court of California, en banc, re-
versed the lower court's order suppressing this
evidence. The key point in the holding is that
"persons conditionally released to society ...
may have a reduced expectation of privacy,
thereby rendering certain intrusions by govern-
mental authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise
would be invalid under traditional constitu-
tional [fourth amendment] concepts, at least to
the extent such intrusions are necessitated by
legitimate governmental demands."'" Hence,
the rehabilitative and protective goals of the
1972); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630,
97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016
(1972); State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663,207 S.E.2d
263 (1974); People v. Santos, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526, 31
App. Div. 2d 508 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 969
(1970).
Cases holding a form of the blanket search condi-
tion invalid are United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521
F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975);
United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp.
1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Peterson, 62 Mich.
App. 258, 233 N.W.2d 250 (1975). In some of these
cases a distinction is drawn between searches by law
enforcement officers and those by correctional au-
thorities. Only the police officer may not search with-
out probable cause; e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d
246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). For a
discussion of an appropriate standard for searches by
correctional officers, see Note, Fourth Amendment
Limitations of Probation and Parole Supervision, 1976
DUKE LJ. 71.
10 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
n1 Id. at 764-65, 488 P.2d at 633, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
305.
probation system are considered legitimate
governmental demands which are important
enough to override the probationer's fourth
amendment rights.
The new approach to blanket search condi-
tion validity is most thoroughly analyzed in
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez.12 There, po-
lice received a tip that the defendant was deal-
ing in heroin. They learned that she was cur-
rently on probation from an earlier heroin
smuggling conviction and was subject to a blan-
ket search condition. Accordingly, the officers
searched the defendant's apartment and un-
covered 11.7 grams of heroin, providing the
basis for a new conviction. The Ninth Circuit,
en banc, reversed this conviction, holding the
condition invalid. The court reasoned that cer-
tain governmental intrusions -searches by pro-
bation officers-are not only compatible with
rehabilitation, but are essential if the proba-
tioner is a prior narcotics offender. However,
the blanket search condition goes too far. It
would permit intimidating and harassing
searches which could not possibly be "necessi-
tated by legitimate governmental demands."
The probationer's fourth amendment rights
are therefore preserved, at least in part, by the
Ninth Circuit's approach.
Those courts which have determined that the
probationer enjoys fourth amendment rights
are then confronted with a second analytical
step. What protection is to be afforded these
rights? The focal point of this issue is the role of
the exclusionary rule 13 in a probation revoca-
tion hearing.14 By definition, the probationer's
fourth amendment rights are afforded exclu-
sionary rule protection in a new criminal pro-
ceeding's, but that same protection is seldom
extended to the probation revocation hearing.
6
The widely accepted argument against exten-
sion of the rule is articulated in United States v.
12 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
3 Supra, note 8.
14 For an excellent analysis of the role of the exclu-
sionary rule in a probation revocation hearing, see
Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole
Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on Deterrence
and the "Imperative of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 21 (1975).
I, Supra, note 8.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1975) (probation); United States ex rel. Sper-
ling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) (pa-
role). See also United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d
1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1975) (supporting cases com-
piled in opinion).
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Winsett. 17 In Winsett, the defendant was on pro-
bation following a narcotics conviction subject
to a condition that he not leave his judicial
district. United States Border Patrol agents,
unaware of his probationary status, stopped the
defendant at a checkpoint outside his judicial
district and discoverd 100 pounds of marijuana.
Since, the search was illegal,"' the evidence was
inadmissible to establish a new conviction for
unlawful possession. The federal probation of-
fice then sought to revoke probation, since the
defendant was seen outside his judicial district
in violation of the condition. The Ninth Circuit
held that the exclusionary rule, although
properly invoked to suppress evidence in a
criminal proceeding, is not applicable to a sub-
sequent revocation proceeding.
The Winsett holding is based upon a two-step
analysis. First, it must be determined whether
extension of the exclusionary rule to probation
revocation hearings would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. Second, any potential deter-
rent benefits must be balanced against the po-
tential injury to the function of the revocation
hearing in which the illegally obtained evidence
is to be used. 9 The court reasoned that exten-
sion of the rule may deter police misconduct in
that illegal searches consciously directed at pro-
bationers might in some instances be discour-
aged. 0 This potential benefit must be balanced
17 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
1
8 Id. at 52. The border search was illegal based on
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) and United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir.) (en banc), affd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
19 518 F.2d at 54.
20 Id. at 54-55. Winsett's holding is confined to the
situation where, at the time of the illegal arrest and
search, the police had neither knowledge nor reason
to believe that the suspect was a probationer.
Comparing Winsett to its decision in Verdugo v.
United States, 402 F.2d 599, 612 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970), the Ninth Circuit noted:
[T]his court applied the exclusionary rule to sen-
tencing proceedings where the police were fa-
miliar with past narcotic violators and current
suspects and had a personal stake in seeing not
only that a violator was convicted, but also that
he receive a lengthy sentence. The court rea-
soned that in the absence of the exclusionary
rule an officer would have an incentive, given
the proper circumstances, to lawfully obtain only
so much evidence as is necessary to assure con-
viction of the defendant of a single offense, and
then proceed to unlawfully obtain evidence of
additional offenses which would ensure a long
sentence.
against the potential harm to the probation sys-
tem, i.e. that known violations of conditions
will go uncorrected. Since the conditions are
designed to further the goals of probation,
their violation may indicate that the proba-
tioner is incapable of rehabilitation.2 1 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that this balancing
process precludes extension of the exclusionary
rule.
In Tamez v. State, 22 the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals?3 reviewed whether a blanket
search condition could render otherwise illegal
evidence admissible in a probation revocation
hearing. The defendant had been placed on
probation subject to a blanket search condition
after he had pleaded nolo contendere to pos-
session of marijuana. At a stationary checkpoint
approximately twenty-five miles north of the
Mexican border, a United States Border Patrol
agent searched the defendant without consent
and without probable cause. Since the search
was invalid as a border search, 24 the handgun
Similarly, when the police at the moment of
search know that a suspect is a probationer, they
may have a significant incentive to carry out an
illegal search even though knowing that evi-
dence would be inadmissible in any criminal
proceeding. The police have nothing to risk: If
the motion to suppress in the criminal proceed-
ings were denied, the defendant would stand
convicted of a new crime; and if the motion were
granted, the defendant would still find himself
behind bars due to revocation of probation.
Thus, in such circumstances, extension of the
exclusionary rule to the probation revocation
proceeding may be necessary to effectuate
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
Id. at 54 n.5.
21 Because violation of probation conditions may
indicate that the probationer is not ready or is
incapable of rehabilitation by integration into
society, it is extremely important that all reliable
evidence shedding light on the probationer's
conduct be available during probation revoca-
tion proceedings.
518 F.2d at 55 (emphasis in original). The emphasis
on reliable evidence should be noted. Thus, nothing
should preclude the exclusion of unreliable evidence
in probation revocation hearings. In Coleman v.
State, 505 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), an
eyewitness identification of the probationer was sup-
pressed at a revocation hearing because it was too
suggestive.
22 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
' In a Texas criminal case, the Court of Criminal
Appeals is the highest state court of appeals.
24 The court concluded that searches conducted at
traffic checkpoints removed from the border are in-
valid as border searches, citing Almeida-Sanchez v.
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found in the defendant's possession would be
inadmissible in any criminal proceeding. How-
ever, the handgun was admitted at a hearing in
which the defendant's probation was revoked.
The court of criminal appeals reversed the or-
der revoking probation2n and adopted the ra-
tionale of Consuelo-Gonzalez. A blanket search
condition cannot render admissible otherwise
illegal evidence. The condition is too broad,
since it would permit "an intimidating and har-
assing search to serve law enforcement ends
totally unrelated to either his prior conviction
or his rehabilitation .... "6 To be reasonable,
a condition must contribute significantly both
to probationer rehabilitation and to societal
protection.
The significance of Tamez derives from the
unique circumstances of the jurisdiction. Texas
is ajuridiction which does not follow the Winsett
approach to the exclusionary rule.27 It is settled
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (the fourth amend-
ment prohibits the use of roving patrols to search
vehicles at points removed from the border); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Almeida-Sanchez
is not applied retroactively); United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (except at the border,
agents may stop vehicles only if they are aware of
specific facts which reasonably warrant suspicion);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (Almeida-
Sanchez extended to traffic checkpoints removed
from the border); United States v. Martinez, 526 F.2d
954 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz given
retrospective effect).
2 The court decided that the hearing judge had
abused his discretion in revoking the defendant's
probation. It held that the allegations of a probation
violation should be fully and clearly set forth in the
motion to revoke probation so that the probationer
may prepare his defense. The defendant was subject
to a probationary .condition requiring that he "(a)
Commit no offense against the laws of this State or
any other State or of the United States." 534 S.W.2d
at 688. In its motion to revoke probation, the state
alleged that the defendant "did receive and possess
firearms, to wit: a pistol and a shotgun in violation of
the Penal Laws of the United States and in violation
of condition 'a' of the Judgment placing him on pro-
bation." Id. The court held that the defendant had no
notice of which federal gun law he had supposedly
violated. Id. at 689.
26 534 S.W.2d at 692.
27 The only other jurisdiction not following Winsett
is Oklahoma, Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla.
Crim. 1973). In Michaud, the defendant pleaded
guilty to the possession of marijuana and was placed
on probation. At a hearing revoking the defendant's
probation, the trial judge denied a motion to sup-
press evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
issued without probable cause. The Oklahoma Court
in Texas that a probationer's fourth amend-
ment rights are afforded exclusionary rule pro-
tection in a probation revocation hearing.28 In
Tamez, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
confronted the determination of a proba-
tioner's constitutional status in a posture signifi-
cantly different than that of other courts. As in
other jurisdictions testing the validity of a blan-
ket search and seizure condition, the dichotomy
was clear: either the traditional Mason or the
new Consuelo-Gonzalez approach would be used.
Unlike other jurisdictions, if the Tamez court
chose to adopt the Consuelo-Gonzalez approach,
the second analytical step was made as well.
Texas could not extend greater fourth amend-
ment rights to probationers by invalidating the
blanket search condition as unnecessarily broad
without also protecting those rights in the revo-
cation hearing. Yet, despite both its unique cir-
cumstances and the refusal of other courts to
of Criminal Appeals reversed the revocation order
holding that "revocation may only be had upon com-
petent evidence" and that "[e]vidence obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure [is] . . . 'in-
competent evidence'. . . . The distinction between a
criminal trial and a revocation hearing does not abro-
gate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1402-03 (cita-
tions omitted).
28 Rushing v. State, 500 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1973) (fruits of a search of a probationer with-
out probable cause not admissible in a revocation
hearing); Hegdal v. State, 488 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1972) (fruits of a search conducted under
a warrant which contained probable cause were ad-
missible in a revocation hearing).
It is unclear, however, whether a probation revoca-
tion hearing is a "criminal proceeding" in Texas,
thereby mandating use of the exclusionary rule. In
1971 the Texas Supreme Court held that a criminal
prosecution includes a proceeding in which probation
is revoked. Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.
1971). Prior to this decision, the court of criminal
appeals had consistently held that such a hearing was
not a trial in the constitutional sense. Campbell v.
State, 456 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970); Hulsey
v. State, 447 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Grim. App. 1969);
Cooper v. State, 447 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Grim. App.
1969); Tate v. State, 365 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Grim. App.
1963).Fariss seems to have had little effect. The Court
of criminal appeals continues to treat such proceed-
ings as being outside the meaning of the Texas Con-
stitution and has in fact stated that, "a hearing on a
motion to revoke is not a trial in the constitutional
sense," Hill v. State, 480 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972), and that
it "is not a criminal trial," Stembridge v. State, 477
S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972). See Comment,A
Survey of Recent Law Concerning Revocation of Probation
in Texas, 15 S. TEX. L.J. 92, 99-100 (1974).
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extend the exclusionary rule, the Texas court
chose to adopt the Consuelo-Gonzalez approach.
The controversy over the constitutional sta-
tus of the probationer has generated two ap-
proaches to the validity of blanket search condi-
tions. The choice presented to courts depends
upon the level of governmental intrusion con-
sidered necessary to achieve the dual goals of
the probation system. Until Tamez v. State, no
court had been willing both to recognize the
probationer's right to be free from a blanket
search condition and to protect that right in the
revocation hearing. Now, in the Texas contin-
uum from the prisoner to the free person, the
probationer has acquired almost the full range
of fourth amendment rights available to the
latter.
ABORTION RECORDKEEPING AND RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
The constitutional right of privacy includes a
qualified right to an abortion. In Roe v. Wade, 29
the Supeme Court held that the constitution-
ally-protected right of privacy is "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy."" A related
issue of privacy is raised when a state requires
collection of personal information from those
who obtain abortions. Although in the past the
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to
uphold governmental data collection, 31 the in-
formation collected was not as "personal" as
abortion information.
Recently, in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth, 2 the Court upheld a statutory
provision which required that a patient's name
be included in the health facility file recording
her abortion, where the sole use to be made of
the collected data was statistical. 33 In finding
29 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30 Id. at 153.
31 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), where the
Court held that the existence of an army intelligence
data bank did not violate first amendment rights
because the plaintiffs were not able to show that they
sustained an injury or that they were in immediate
danger of sustaining direct injury. See also California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), where
the Court held that required maintenance of records
by the banks for certain transactions did not consti-
tute a seizure, and claims of constitutional violations
were premature because the government had not
requested disclosure of the information.
32 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
3 The Court considered infringements on the
right to abort and struck down the statutory require-
ment of spousal consent as "inconsistent with the
the abortion recordkeeping system in Danforth
constitutionally permissible, the Court cau-
tioned that there are limits: abortion record-
keeping must be reasonably directed to protect-
ing maternal health, must not be abused, must
respect the confidentiality and privacy of the
patient, and must not have a legally significant
impact or consequence on the abortion deci-
sion .4
Eight months before Danforth, the New York
Court of Appeals, in Schulman v. New York City
Health and Hospital Corp.,3s directly confronted
the question whether the requirement of man-
datory filing of a certificate when an abortion is
performed violates a woman's right to abort
and her right to privacy in the use of her
name. 6 The court, in a four to three decision,
approved a city recordkeeping provision which
required that an abortion patient's name and
address be entered on a termination of preg-
nancy certificate sent to a centralized computer.
The patient's personal abortion information
was then included in records serving both sta-
standards enunciated in Roe v. Wade," 96 S.Ct. at
2842, and also struck down the parental consent pro-
vision. The Court did not specifically address a right
to privacy concerning use of one's name.
34 428 U.S. at 80-81.
35 38 N.Y.2d 234,342 N.E.2d 501,379 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1975). A doctor who performed an abortion at the
patient's request did not file the required certificate.
The doctor and patient instituted court proceedings
to ascertain the constitutionality of the name require-
ment.
36 It is unclear if there is a right to privacy concern-
ing the use of one's name for personal data. In Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that the right of privacy does not
include protection against dissemination of a person's
name when it was obtained from judicial records kept
in connection with a public prosecution and which are
open to public inspection, even if the publication was
embarrassing or otherwise painful to the individual.
Id. at 491. InJaffess v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, 393 F. Supp. 626 (1975), the court
rejected a contention that Jaffess' right of privacy was
violated by disclosure of his name and social security
benefits to the Veteran's Administration: "the present
thrust of the decisional law does not include within its
compass the right of an individual to prevent disclo-
sure by one governmental agency to another of mat-
ters obtained in the course of the transmitting
agency's regular functions." Id. at 629. The court
went on to emphasize, however, that it did not "sug-
gest that a constitutional right of privacy might not be
found to exist and appropriate relief granted in in-
stances where the government is possessed of highly
personal and confidential information which has
been given under compulsion of law and with an
expectation of privacy .... Id. at 630.
[Vol. 68
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tistical and counseling purposes. The Schulman
majority found that the requirement did not
interfere with the decision to abort37 and that
the right of privacy did not extend to situations
where the government gathers information for
legitimate purposes.38 However, a comparison
of the nature and purpose of recordkeeping in
Danforth with the uses of data permitted in
Schulman indicates that the recordkeeping
method approved in Schulman exceeds the limi-
tations suggested in Danforth.
In Roe v. Wade,39 the Supreme Court held
that the right of privacy includes a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. The right to an abortion is qualified,
however, for it must be balanced against impor-
tant state interests. The state has a significant
interest in protecting a woman's health after the
first trimester of pregnancy, and concern for
the potential life of the fetus becomes a legiti-
mate state interest after viability (at approxi-
mately the third trimester). The state may
therefore subject abortions performed after
these stages to reasonable regulation. 0
Roe v. Wade forbids imposing restrictions or
regulations on first trimester abortions, 41 and
raises the question whether any records may be
maintained for abortions performed during
this period. The answer which Danforth pro-
vides is that such records may be maintained if
they conform to certain guidelines. The rec-
ords at issue in Danforth were maintained to
provide a source of pertinent information to
assist in preserving maternal health and life.
42
37 38 N.Y.2d at 240, 342 N.E.2d at 504, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 706.38 Id. at 243, 342 N.E.2d at 506, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
709.
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).40 Id. at 160.
41 See, Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th
Cir. 1974) where the court held that the city could not
establish sweeping regulations for "abortion clinics"
even though the city did not proscribe abortions,
because failure to exclude first trimester abortions
made the regulations overbroad and unreasonably
infringed on fundamental right. See also, Friendship
Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505
F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997
(1975) where the court held that the city could not
require certain equipment for the abortion proce-
dure which was not required for similar surgical pro-
cedures, because first trimester abortions must be
free from state interference and must be treated as
other medical procedures of similar complexity.
42 428 U.S. at 80. See House Comm. Substitute
House Bill No. 1211, §10(1), 77th Gen. Assembly of
Mo., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1974).
The data were to be collated statistically, and
they remained confidential. The records,
stored in the permanent files of the health facil-
ity where the abortion was performed, were to
be destroyed after seven years. "[W]hile per-
haps approaching permissible limits, [record-
keeping] of this kind [is] not constitutionally
offensive"4 3 in itself, said the Danforth Court:
The added requirements for confidentiality,
with the sole exception for public health offi-
cers, and for retention for seven years, a period
not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade
us in our determination of the constitutional
limits. 44
Although the Court in Danforth did not spe-
cifically address the question whether govern-
mental collection of abortion data similar to the
type upheld in Schulman is constitutionally per-
missible, Danforth implies that Schulman-type
recordkeeping is an unwarranted intrusion by
the government into private life. New York
City's provision required that all abortions be
reported to the Health Department. The rec-
ords were not subject to subpoena, but could be
inspected by the Health Commissioner and
other "authorized personnel." 4 A centralized
computer was used to cull statistical data and to
provide information for public health counsel-
ing, which led to wide dissemination of abor-
tion information. 6 No procedures had been
43 428 U.S. at 81.
44 Id.
" NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE, § 204.07 (as
amended 1973), NEW YORK CITY AD. CODE, ch. 22,
tit. A, § 567.
4 38 N.Y.2d at 238, 342 N.E.2d at 503, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 704. Two public health experts submitted
affidavits showing public health objectives of the ter-
mination of pregnancy certificates:
1. Allowing follow-up where complications
ensue.
2. Enabling the Department of Health to de-
termine whether orthodox procedures were fol-
lowed.
3. Enabling the department to determine
whether further investigation or regulation is
required.
4. Facilitating the collection of public health
data as yet nonexistent on the possible adverse
effects of an abortion or of multiple abortions on
the same woman.
5. Ensuring the efficient compilation of this
data and to allow the department to retrieve a
particular patient's record from an abortion ser-
vice where the patients are identified only by
name and address.
6. Offering public health counseling on ade-
quate family planning measures as alternative
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established by statute or by Health Department
regulation to discontinue culling and storing
abortion information after the need for the
information ceased .
4
Although Danforth upheld the keeping of
abortion records, the methods used in that case
and the degree of access to the information
were significantly different from Schulman's
computerized abortion registry. Danforth abor-
tion records were maintained, along with other
hospital records, in the permanent health facil-
ity files. Schulman abortion records, on the
other hand, were stored not only where the
abortion was performed but also in a central-
ized computer registry exclusively concerned
with abortions. The maintenance of localized,
confidential records is a "far cry from the mas-
sive, open-ended compilation of names created
by New York's regulation and is obviously a
more palatable approach .' '  Furthermore,
"there is an enormous difference between the
knowledge that one's name exists, together with
the names of all patients, not just abortion pa-
tients, merely in a hospital record somewhere
in an immense metropolis, and the knowledge
that the local political body has compiled a spe-
cial file of all those who have sought this partic-
ular treatment. '49 The reasonable seven-year
period for which records were maintained
helped persuade the Danforth Court that the
recordkeeping scheme before it was constitu-
tional.50 The unrestricted retention of records
in Schulman, however, extends the potential for
abuse .51
The type of recordkeeping in Danforth is not
as readily susceptible to breaches in confiden-
tiality and privacy as is computerized record-
keeping. Even where the information is to be
means of birth control to repeated abortions.
7. Ensuring that women who test positive for
venereal disease, sickle cell anemia, and RH
negative factor which affect the health of any
future children receive proper health counsel-
ing and treatment./d.
47 Id. at 244, 342 N.E.2d at 507, 379 N.Y.S. 2d at
710.4 8Id. at 247, 342 N.E.2d at 509, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 713
(Wachtler, J., dissenting) (referring to the three-
judge district court decision in Danforth, 392 F. Supp.
1362 (E.D.Mo. 1975).491d. at 254, 342 N.E.2d at 513, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
718-719 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
50 428 U.S. at 81.
51 Id.
kept confidential, computerization necessarily
results in broader access. Because of the num-
ber of employees required to handle and proc-
ess the data before and during compilation of a
patient's computerized file, the information is
not well protected: "The problem is how to
prevent 'authorized' access for 'unauthorized'
purposes, since most leakage of data from per-
sonal data systems . . .appears to result from
improper actions of employees either bribed to
obtain information, or supplying it to outsi-
ders. '52 Furthermore, "the impersonal data sys-
tem, and faceless users of the information it
contains tend to be accountable only in the
formal sense of the word. In practice they are
for the most part immune to whatever sanctions
the individual can invoke." 3 The impersonality
and unaccountability of computerized data sys-
tems is perceived by the public, and may lead to
widespread fears that computer use adversely
affects personal privacy.M Such fears may have
an impact on a woman's abortion decision and
this, according to Danforth, is a constitutionally
impermissible consequence of recordkeeping.
Differences between the purposes served by
Danforth and Schulman abortion records also
lead to significant variation in the dissemination
of the personal abortion data. In Danforth, the
statutory language explicitly provides that
abortion records "shall be confidential and shall
be used only for statistical purposes."" Schul-
man purposes go beyond mere statistical compi-
lation, as the stated objectives of the regulation
include the provision of counseling services to
those identified in the certificates. The city's
interests in counseling and advisory services are
not sufficiently compelling to warrant inclusion
of the patient's name and address on the termi-
nation of pregnancy certificate.
Judge Wachtler, dissenting in Schulman,
found that the "only valid objective presented"
by the city was the compilation of public health
data, and the city was unable to demonstrate
52 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS,
COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 19 (1973).
53 Id. at 30.
11 "In more than one opinion survey, worries and
anxieties about computers and personal privacy show
up in the replies of about one third of those inter-
viewed." Id. at 29.
" 428 U.S. at 79. House Comm. Substitute House
Bill No. 1211, § 10(3), 77th Gen. Assembly of Mo., 2d
Sess. (June 14, 1974).
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why the patient's name and address were neces-
sary when a system of coded numbers could
serve the same purpose. 56 Studies have shown
that a serious problem of computer bank pri-
vacy violations results "to the extent that infor-
mation stored in data banks bears a personal
label."
5 7
Judge Fuchsberg, also dissenting in Schul-
man, considered the follow-up of unrelated dis-
eases and contraceptive counseling to be serious
violations of a woman's privacy:5 an invasion of
constitutionally-protected privacy "in order to
facilitate the achievement of health goals which
were unrelated to abortion is so clearly pro-
hibited by the Supreme Court decisions as to
require no further comment here. '59 Judge
Fuchsberg was offended by the implication of
the statute that it was appropriate for the city to
"seek out certain categories of abortion patients
and advise them, paternalistically, of the best
contraceptive methods to follow.
60
Although the extent to which an individual's
right of privacy protects her against collection
and dissemination of abortion information has
not been clearly delineated, the Danforth opin-
ion provides guidelines for the states in the
collection and use of such data. Methods and
purposes of keeping abortion records must be
reasonably directed to the protection of mater-
nal health and life. The power to keep abortion
records must not be abused, and the patients
confidentiality and privacy must be properly
respected. Finally, abortion recordkeeping
should not have a legally significant impact on a
woman's decision whether to have an abortion.
The computerized method approved in Schul-
man does not appear to meet the Danforth re-
quirements, and it remains to be seen whether
any computerized system would do so.
SEXUAL PRIVACY
The act of sodomy6 ' is still a criminal offense
56 38 N.Y.2d at 247, 342 N.E.2d at 509, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 712 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
17 R. MILLER, DATA BANKS AND PRIVACY, COM-
PUTERS AND THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
157 (2d ed. 1969).
5 38 N.Y.2d at 252, 342 N.E.2d at 512, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 717 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 252.342 N.E.2d at 512,379 N.Y.S.2d at 717
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
O Id.
6 "[S]odomy: carnal copulation with a member of
the same sex or with an animal or unnatural carnal
copulation with a member of the opposite sex; the
in a majority of states. 62 Most state statutes sim-
ply prohibit this particular type of sexual con-
duct, making no distinction between married or
unmarried, homosexual or heterosexual partic-
ipants and public or private acts. 63 Ever since
the United States Supreme Court's 1965 deci-
sion in Griswold v. Connecticut," however, the
constitutionality of these statutes has been in
doubt. Griswold, which had its roots in previous
decisions that limited state intrusion into child
rearing, 65 procreation,66 and marriage, 67 struck
penetration of the male organ into the mouth or anus
of another." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2165 (1966).
62 In varying degrees deviate sexuality has been
regarded with intense aversion in nearly all
times and civilizations, and subject to condemna-
tion by religious interdict or severe secular pun-
ishment. Depending on the environment and
education of the analyst, deviate sexuality may
be attributed to spiritual illness (sin), to im-
proper early psychic influences, or to a congeni-
tal and hereditary defect. ALI MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.5 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
Biblical condemnation of sodomy may be found in
Leviticus 18:22-23, Leviticus 20:13, and Deuteronomy
23:17. American statutes prohibiting sodomy were
modeled after the English common law and statutory
regulation of such acts.
At first there was some doubt as to whether this
offense was classified as a felony or a misde-
meanor. However, it soon came to be consid-
ered so repulsive that the obtainment of prop-
erty under threat of accusation of sodomy con-
stituted robbery. Comment, The Bedroom Should
Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W. L.
REV. 115, 115-16 (1968).
As of 1975, forty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia had sodomy statutes. For a compilation of
statutes, see Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbid-
ding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1613, nn.1 & 2 (1976).
6E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (West 1969):
"Sodomy, or the infamous crime against nature, com-
mitted with man or beast, is a high misdemeanor, and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000,
or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or
both."
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to pri-
vate school students before the completion of eighth
grade held violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth admentment).
66 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state
law providing for sterilization of persons convicted of
two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude"
held violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
67 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state anti-
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down Connecticut's statutes8 prohibiting the
use of contraceptives on the theory that they
violated the constitutional right to privacy. 69
However, the Court in Griswold did not make
clear the precise nature or scope of this right to
privacy. Subsequent cases 70 have extended the
right beyond the marital relationship, which
was the focus of the Griswold decision, but it is
still unclear whether the right is a narrow one,
relating only to decisions concerning procrea-
tion, or whether it is a broader right to sexual
privacy, thus protecting most sexual behavior,
including sodomy, from state interference and
regulation. There is considerable divergence of
opinion among lower courts on this issue.
In Lovisi v. Slayton,7" the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to husband and
wife petitioners convicted of committing so-
domy on each other in their own bedroom in
the presence of a third party. 72 The Fourth
miscegenation statutes held violative of the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment).
61 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)
' The Court found the right to privacy in the
"penumbra" of the Bill of Rights, emanating from the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of
the United States Constitution. 381 U.S. at 484.
70 See notes 102-08 infra and accompanying text.
1' 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 2542 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1976) (No. 76-184).
72 Petitioners Aldo and Margaret Lovisi were con-
victed in the state court for sodomy with each other in
violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1950) (cur-
rent version at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1975)),
which provides:
Crimes against nature.-If a person shall car-
nally know in any manner any brute animal, or
carnally know any male or female person by the
anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily
submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the
penitentiary not less than one year nor more
than three years.
The prosecution was initiated after one of the Lov-
isis' two daughters brought a photograph to school
which allegedly portrayed her and an adult male
completely unclothed. The picture was destroyed by
a teacher, but ultimately led to the execution of a
search warrant and a search of the Lovisis' home. The
search produced hundreds of erotic pictures, includ-
ing photographs of the acts for which the Lovisis were
convicted. The Lovisis had placed advertisements in a
magazine, Swinger's Life. After answering one of the
advertisements, Earl Romeo Dunn met with the Lov-
isis three times. The last meeting took place in the
Lovisis' home in Virginia Beach, Virginia. This pros-
ecution was brought for acts performed by the Lovisis
Circuit recognized the existence of the right to
privacy and the fact that the Lovisis, a married
couple engaging in sexual intimacies within
their home, were protected from state intrusion
by this right. 73 However, the court limited the
right to privacy to "circumstances in which it
may reasonably be expected. ' 74 Apparently de-
fining privacy in terms of physical seclusion,75
the court determined that the Lovisis had
waived their right to privacy because of the
presence of the third party:
Once a married couple admits strangers as on-
lookers, federal protection of privacy dis-
solves .... The presence of the onlooker,
Dunn, in the Lovisis' bedroom dissolved the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy shared by the
Lovisis when alone.
7 6
Thus, the Fourth Circuit has limited the right
to privacy, even among married persons, to
those situations in which there is a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." This limit, however, is
not derived from privacy cases but rather from
fourth amendment decisions such as Katz v.
United States, 77 cited, inter alia, by the Lovisi
court. Katz involved a conviction for violating a
federal statute prohibiting the transmission of
wagering information across state lines .7 The
government's evidence was obtained by attach-
ing an electronic bugging device to the outside
of the telephone booth from which the defend-
ant made his calls. In reversing the conviction,
the United States Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected .
on each other and not for the involvement of Dunn. In
a separate proceeding, Margaret Lovisi was convicted
of sodomy with Dunn. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F.
Supp. 620, 621 (E.D.Va. 1973). Dunn's participation
in the affair resulted in deportation to his native
Jamaica. 539 F.2d at 350 n.2.
73 539 F.2d at 351.
74 Id.
71 "[T]he marital intimacies shared by the Lovisis
when alone and in their own bedroom are within
their protected right of privacy." Id. at 351.
76
Id. at 351-52.
77 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
78 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1966).
9 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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Thus, even if derived soley from the fourth
amendment, the Lovisis' right to privacy may
arguably have been preserved despite the pres-
ence of Dunn because the act took place in the
bedroom of their home-a strong indication
that the Lovisis sought "to preserve as private"
their sexual conduct. Furthermore, the right to
privacy has roots deeper than the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. As the Supreme Court
stated in Griswold, the right emanates from the
first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amend-
ments of the Constitution.80
The same statute at issue in Lovisi was also
upheld in a different context in Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for Richmond.8 1 Here, the dis-
trict court denied male homosexual petitioners'
request for injunctive relief to restrain enforce-
ment of the statute. The petitioners claimed
that enforcement would deny their rights to
due process, freedom of expression and pri-
vacy, and contravene their constitutional guar-
antee against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court, however, found the statute to be an
exercise of a legitimate state interest. According
to the court, the constitutional right to privacy
inheres only in the context of the marital,
home and family relationship. 2 Thus, it does
not prevent the state from punishing those who
engage in homosexual acts.
Although the opinion does not clearly specify
what the state's legitimate interests 3 are in reg-
80 381 U.S. at 484.
81 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), affd mem., 425
U.S. 901 (1976). The Supreme Court's affirmance was
cited by the Fourth Circuit in an addendum to its
Lovisi decision, 539 F.2d at 352. The court maintained
thatDoe reinforced its decision inLovisi. However, its
reliance on Doe is seemingly unwarranted. Not only
are the facts of the two cases strikingly different-Doe
involved nonmarital, homosexual behavior, whereas
Lovisi concerned marital, heterosexual behavior-but
the Supreme Court simply affirmed without com-
ment, thus making it impossible to determine the
basis of its reasoning.
1 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
8 One commentator, in discussing California's oral
copulation statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West
1972), lists the following presumably universal inter-
ests advanced by the state of California in support of
its statute:
[T]he protection of the young from sexual as-
sault, the protection of public decency, and the
prevention of the spread of venereal disease,
which, if achieved by the statute, would tend to
promote public health, safety, morals and wel-
fare.
ulating such conduct, it relied heavily on Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,8 4 to
the effect that "the State's rightful concern for
its people's moral welfare" would allow it to
punish "adultery, homosexuality, fornication
and incest . . .however privately practiced.""5
Concern for the moral welfare of its citizens has
been a traditional area of state interest. The Doe
court, however, appears to rest its conclusion
that the state can continue to regulate in this
area on the fact that it always has. It reasoned
that:
Although a questionable law is not removed
from question by the lapse of any prescriptive
period, the longevity of the Virginia statute does
testify to the State's interest and its legiti-
macy.... In sum, we believe that the sodomy
statute, so long in force in Virginia, has a ra-
tional basis of State interest demonstrably legiti-
mate and mirrored in the cited decisional law of
the Supreme Court. 6
In light of several recent cases restricting
state power to enforce sodomy statutes, the
longevity argument loses strength. Further-
more, the Supreme Court has not written a
recent opinion dealing with homosexual con-
duct. Consequently, it is uncertain whether the
constitutional right to privacy affects the states'
traditional regulation of atypical sexual behav-
ior.
A number of state courts"7 have also dis-
missed the argument that every adult individ-
ual has the right to perform any private, con-
sensual sexual act. One illustrative decision is
State v. Bateman,8 s in which the Supreme Court
of Arizona upheld the constitutionality of Ari-
zona's sodomy and lewd and lascivious acts stat-
utes. The court acknowledged the right to pri-
vacy derived from Griswold and its progeny, but
upheld the constitutionality of the challenged
Comment, Oral Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain
Must be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 523 (1974). One
may also hypothesize a state interest in promoting
procreative activity: sodomitic acts do not result in
offspring.
84 367 U.S. 497 (1961), a case in which the majority
had refused to adjudicate a constitutional challenge
to Connecticut's contraception statute.
5 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
87 See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d
1352 (1976); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287
A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
88 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
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statutes, distinguishing regulation of sexual
conduct from sexual misconduct:
The United States Supreme Court is the ulti-
mate authority interpreting the United States
Constitution .... While it has been said in Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt that the state cannot interfere
with the private sexual behavior of two adults, in
neither of those opinions did it determine that
the State could not regulate sexual misconduct. 89
Support for the Arizona court's distinction
between regulation of sexual conduct and sex-
ual misconduct can be found in Mr. Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold: "[Ilt
should be said of the Court's holding today that
it in no way interferes with a state's proper
regulation of sexual promiscuity or miscon-
duct."90 Justice Goldberg, however, provided
no basis for his statement. Nothing in the
Court's language in Griswold or in subsequent
decisions specifically deals with this distinction.
And, certainly, nothing in the opinions makes it
clear that the states' interest in regulating pri-
vate sexual "misconduct" between consenting
adults overrides the individual right to be free
of state interference.
In striking contrast to the decisions of the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona, which upheld state regulation of sexual
conduct, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted
the Supreme Court's privacy decisions to limit
severely a state's power to regulate sexual activ-
ity. In Cotner v. Henry,91 the Seventh Circuit
reversed the defendant's conviction for sodomy
with his wife because the affidavit in the case
contained no allegation of the use of force.92
The court determined that, in the absence of an
overriding state interest, the constitutionality of
the Indiana sodomy statute9 3 could be main-
tained only if construed "as being inapplicable
to married persons or as outlawing such physi-
cal relations between married couples only
when accompanied by force." 94 According to
81 547 P.2d at 9 (citations omitted). In Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Supreme Court invali-
dated Massachusetts' contraception statute which lim-
ited the distribution of all contraceptive materials to
married persons and stated that the right to privacy
relates to the individual and not merely the married
couple.
90 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (Goldberg,J., concurring).
91 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968).92 Id. at 876.
" IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-89-1 (Burns 1975).
91 394 F.2d at 875-76.
the court, "[tihe import of the Griswold decision
is that private, consensual marital relations are
protected from regulation by the state through
the use of a criminal penalty."95
Massachusetts and New Jersey courts have
taken a similar approach and narrowly con-
strued their sodomy statutes .96 The United
States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas has gone even farther and declared
the state sodomy statute97 to be unconstitu-
9- Id. at 875.
The American Law Institute Model Penal Code
adopts the view that consensual private sexual
conduct between adults should not ordinarily be
subject to criminal sanction. Illinois, as well as
many other states, has adopted this ap-
proach....
Id. at 875 n.3.
96 Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478
(Mass. 1974) (statute inapplicable to private, consen-
sual conduct of adults); Lear v. State, 62 N J. 388,301
A.2d 748 (1973) (deviate sexual conduct of married
couples not within scope of statute). This approach
conforms, at least in part, to the recommendations of
the American Law Institute.
97 VERNON'S ANN. PENAL CODE, art. 524 (re-
pealed):
Sodomy. Whoever has carnal copulation with a
beast, or in an opening of the body, except
sexual parts, with another human being, or
whoever shall use his mouth on the sexual parts
of another human being for the purpose of
having carnal copulation or who shall voluntar-
ily permit the use of his own sexual parts in a
lewd or lascivious manner by any minor, shall be
guilty of sodomy....
The new Texas statutes distinguish between homo-
sexual and heterosexual conduct for some types of
deviate sexual conduct:
§ 21.04. Sexual Abuse
(a) A person commits an offense if, without
the other person's consent and with intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any per-
son, the actor:
(1) engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with the other person, not his spouse,
whether the other person is of the same or
opposite sex; or
(2) compels the other person to engage in
sexual intercourse or deviate sexual inter-
course with a third person, whether the other
person is of the same sex as or opposite sex
from the third person.
(b) The intercourse is without the other per-
son's consent under one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances:
(1) the actor compels the other person to
submit or participate by force that overcomes
such earnest resistance as might be reasonably
expected under the circumstances;
(2) the actor compels the other person to
submit or participate by any threat, communi-
cated by actions, words, or deeds, that would
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tional. In Buchanan v. Batchelor,9 s the court held
the statute to be void on its face for unconstitu-
tional overbreadth because it failed to distin-
guish between married and unmarried per-
sons, private and public acts, and homosexual
and heterosexual conduct.99 Noting that the
marital relationship is not mentioned in the
Constitution, the court stated that it has never-
theless been held to be included in the first
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary
resolution, under the same or similar circum-
stances, because of a reasonable fear of harm;
(3) the other person has not consented and
the actor knows the other person is uncon-
scious or physically unable to resist;
(4) the actor knows that as a result of men-
tal disease or defect the other person is at the
time of the deviate sexual intercourse incapa-
ble either of appraising the nature of the act
or of resisting it;
(5) the other person has not consented and
the actor knows the other person is unaware
that deviate sexual intercourse is occurring;
(6) the actor knows that the other person
submits or participates because of the erro-
neous belief that he is the other person's
spouse; or
(7) the actor has intentionally impaired the
other person's power to appraise or control
the other person's conduct by administering
any substance without the other person's
knowledge.
§ 21.05. Aggravated Sexual Abuse
(a) A person commits an offense if he com-
mits sexual abuse as defined in Section 21.04 of
this code or sexual abuse of a child as defined in
Section 21.10 of this code and he:
(1) causes serious bodily injury or attempts
to cause death to the victim or another in the
course of the same criminal episode; or
(2) compels submission to the sexual abuse
by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on any-
one.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony
of the first degree.
§ 21.06. Homosexual Conduct
(a) A person commits an offense if he en-
gages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class C
misdemeanor.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 21.04-.06 426, (Ver-
non 1974 & Supp. 1976-77).
9 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D.Tex. 1970), vacated, 401
U.S. 989 (1971). This case was remanded for recon-
sideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), which held that only under special circum-
stances will federal injunctive relief be granted to a
petitioner "when a prosecution involving the chal-
lenged statute is pending in state court at the time the
federal suit is initiated." 401 U.S. at 41 n.2.
99 308 F. Supp. at 736.
amendment. 00 While conceding the state's le-
gitimate interest in regulating "sexual promis-
cuity or misconduct," the court said that:
Sodomy is not an act which has the approval of
the majority of the people. In fact such conduct
is probably offensive to the vast majority, but
such opinion is not sufficient reason for the
State to encroach upon the liberty of married
persons in their private conduct. 101
As these cases demonstrate, the law is far
from settled on the question of whether the
right to privacy extends to private, adult acts of
sodomy. Because recognition of the right is
relatively recent and because state regulation of
sexual conduct is a well established tradition,
which many states may be unwilling to give up,
it is certain that additional guidance from the
Supreme Court will be necessary to resolve the
question.
Inexplicably, however, the Supreme Court
has refused to provide such guidance. In
March, 1976, it affirmed without comment the
district court's decision in Doe,10 2 refusing to
hold the Virginia sodomy statute unconstitu-
tional as applied to adult homosexuals. This
summary affirmance is an enigma. The district
court specifically limited the right to privacy in
sexual conduct to the marital relationship. Yet
the Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'
10 3
four years earlier, explicitly announced a right
to individual privacy:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the mar-
ried couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.... 104
In Roe v. Wade, 105 holding the Texas abortion
statutes'0 6 violative of the due process clause of
1oo Id. at 732. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 483-85 (1965).
101 308 F. Supp. at 733. For critical analyses of the
Buchanan decision, see Note, 50 NEB. L. REV. 567
(1971); Note, 49 TEX. L. REV. 400 (1971).
102 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), affd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
1- 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'o Id. at 453.
105 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'0 TEX. REV. CODE. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512.1-.4,
4512.6 (Vernon 1976).
COMMENTS
the fourteenth amendment, the Court also
implicity found an individual right to privacy:
the plaintiff, denied an abortion under Texas
law, was single. The Supreme Court did not
limit her right to privacy on the basis of marital
status: "This right of privacy ... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' '
Of course, neither Eisenstadt nor Roe dealt
with atypical sexual behavior which the courts
of Virginia and Arizona have focused on. Yet in
Stanley v. Georgia, 10 a case dealing with argua-
bly anti-social conduct, possession of pornogra-
phy, the Court limited the power of the state to
intrude into the home, regardless of the marital
status or the sexual proclivities of the defend-
ant: "Whatever may be the justifications for
other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home."' 09
Since all of these decisions seem to indicate
that adult individuals have a broad constitu-
tional right to sexual privacy, at least within the
confines of the home, it is somewhat surprising
that the Supreme Court permitted the Doe deci-
sion to stand. The effect of that decision will be
to create even more variation in lower court
interpretations of the right to privacy." 0 Per-
haps the Court is taking a "hands off' approach
in order to give states time to conform their
statutes to Supreme Court cases and current
scholarly thinking on the subject of sodomy as a
legitimate area of state regulation."' However,
as noted earlier, this approach leads to incon-
sistent state and federal interpretations of the
right to privacy which, in turn, has the constitu-
tionally intolerable result of varying individual
107 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis in original).
108 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"
09 Id. at 565.
110 Such confusion is exemplified by the Lovisi
court's mistaken reliance on the Supreme Court's
affirmance of Doe.
I The American Law Institute stated, as early as
1955:
Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law
all sexual practices not involving force, adult
corruption of minors, or public offense is based
on the following grounds. No harm to the secu-
lar interests of the community is involved in
constitutional rights in different jurisdic-
tions."
12
atypical sex practice in private between consent-
ing adult sex partners. The area of private mor-
als is the distinctive concern of spiritual authori-
ties .... As in the case of illicit heterosexual
relations, existing law is substantially unen-
forced, and there is no real prospect of real
enforcement except against cases of violence,
corruption of minors, and public solicitation.
Statutes that go beyond that permit capricious
selection of a very few cases for prosecution and
serve primarily the interest of blackmailers. Ex-
istence of the criminal threat probably deters
some people from seeking psychiatric or other
assistance for their emotional problems; cer-
tainly conviction and imprisonment are not con-
ducive to cures. Further, there is the fundamen-
tal question of the protection to which every
individual is entitled against state interference in
his personal affairs when he is not hurting oth-
ers. Lastly, the practicalities of police adminis-
tration must be considered. Funds and person-
nel for police work are limited, and it would
appear to be poor policy to use them to any
extent in this area when large-numbers of atro-
cious crimes remain unsolved.
ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent.
Draft No.4, 1955). See also, Note, The Constitutionality
of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72
MIcH. L. REV. 1613 (1976).
Illinois has adopted the approach of the American
Law Institute and has completely removed the crime
of sodomy from the statute books. In its place, Illinois
has substituted a definition of deviate sexual conduct
and an offense of deviate sexual assault. The former
is a definition for use in conjunction with lesser of-
fenses, and the latter is a form of battery. "'Deviate
sexual conduct,' for the purpose of this Article,
means any act of sexual gratification involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2 (1976).
Deviate Sexual Assault.
(a) Any person of the age of 14 years and
upwards who, by force or threat of force, com-
pels any other person to perform or submit to
any act of deviate sexual conduct commits de-
viate sexual assault.
(b) Penalty. A person convicted of deviate
sexual assault shall be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary from 4 to 14 years.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-3 (1976).
1 A grant of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit's
Lovisi decision would be a good opportunity finally to
clarify the right to privacy concerning sodomy, at
least with respect to married persons.
[Vol. 68
